뉴스피드 큐레이션 SNS 대시보드 저널

한 민주당 중진 의원이 동료 의원들에게 트럼프의 정보 수집 체계를 지지해 줄 것을 촉구하고 있다

Wired AI | | 💼 비즈니스
#fbi #tip #미국 #민주당 #정보수집 #트럼프

요약

와이어드가 입수한 내부 메시지에 따르면, 짐 하임즈 하원의원은 카시 파텔이 이끄는 FBI에서 권한 남용 사례가 발견되지 않았다는 이유를 들어, 포괄적인 감시 권한 유지를 동료 의원들에게 독려한 것으로 드러났습니다. 이는 트럼프 행정부의 정보 기관을 지원하자는 주장과 맥락을 같이하며, 향후 감시법 개정 논의에서 당 내 반대 목소리를 잠재우려는 움직임으로 해석됩니다.

왜 중요한가

개발자 관점

검토중입니다

연구자 관점

검토중입니다

비즈니스 관점

검토중입니다

본문

United States congressman Jim Himes, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, is privately lobbying colleagues to preserve the FBI’s power to conduct warrantless searches of Americans’ communications, WIRED has learned, arguing that he has seen no evidence that the Trump administration is abusing its authority. In a letter obtained by WIRED, Himes urges fellow Democrats to support the White House’s request to renew a controversial surveillance program that intercepts the electronic data of foreigners abroad. While targeted at foreigners, the program—authorized under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—also sweeps in vast quantities of private messages belonging to US citizens. Himes’ pitch relies on the “56 reforms” passed by Congress in 2024, which codified the FBI’s own internal protocols as a substitute for constitutional warrants. In the letter, Himes claims these changes are “working as intended” to prevent domestic misuse, citing a compliance rate “exceeding 99 percent” over the past two years. The structural foundations of that defense, however, have been fundamentally altered by recent changes within the FBI. Himes’ “99 percent” compliance metric was produced by the Office of Internal Auditing, for instance—a unit that long served as a smoke alarm designed to detect illegality, but no longer exists. The unit was shuttered by FBI director Kash Patel last year. Historic court opinions based on its data had previously exposed hundreds of thousands of improper FBI searches. Without the auditors required to calculate failure rates, the compliance mechanisms Himes points to have effectively ceased to function. In a statement, Himes’ office largely reiterated the positions laid out in his letter to colleagues. “I am open to making further reforms to Section 702, building on the many successful reforms we made in reauthorization legislation two years ago,” he says. “A short-term reauthorization of Section 702 will enable Congress to thoroughly debate the pros and cons of these suggested reforms—and to determine if compromise is possible—without placing our national security in peril by allowing the program to expire.” As a member of the so-called Gang of Eight—a bipartisan group of lawmakers who are briefed on highly sensitive classified information—Himes possesses some of the deepest knowledge of the spy program. Nevertheless, his letter contains several other claims that appear fundamentally at odds with the mechanics of FISA oversight. “Because of how heavily it is overseen by all three branches of government,” Himes says, “any effort to misuse the program would almost certainly become known to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and to Congress.” The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is a secret court that possesses no investigative arm to audit FBI databases. Similar to Congress, its oversight role is purely reactive, relying entirely on the US Justice Department to self-report violations. “Neither Congress nor the FISA Court conducts independent audits of the FBI’s queries,” says Liza Goitein, senior director of the Brennan Center's Liberty and National Security Program. “They rely on the Department of Justice to conduct thorough audits and to report the results truthfully and promptly. This particular Department of Justice has gutted internal oversight mechanisms and has been rebuked by dozens of federal courts for providing inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete information.” There are no judges standing between the FBI and the private communications of millions of Americans, something that Himes and other members of his committee claim is necessary for the government to react quickly to terrorist threats. Critics argue that, given the current administration’s efforts to dismantle internal checks at the FBI, this is a massive vulnerability, leaving Americans exposed to surveillance abuses that will take years to declassify—if they’re ever reported at all. No members of Congress are actively calling to end the 702 program; even its harshest critics acknowledge its intelligence value. Proponents of constitutional guardrails have also accounted for the need to react quickly: Bills that mandate a warrant for American data—like the recently introduced Government Surveillance Reform Act—consistently feature broad emergency carve-outs. Under that bill, if a threat is imminent or lives are at stake, agents can still quickly access the necessary intelligence without a judge’s approval. It also includes defensive cybersecurity exceptions that allow the government to search for malicious code or infrastructure without a warrant. Under the proposed privacy reforms, the FBI would be barred from running warrantless searches through American data simply to look for spies. Because espionage is a slow-moving and rarely violent threat, agents would need to go to court and present evidence in advance. | Got a Tip? | |---| | Are you a current or former government emplo

관련 저널 읽기

전체 보기 →