Show HN: Agentcheck – 실행하기 전에 AI 에이전트가 액세스할 수 있는 항목을 확인합니다.

agentcheck is a fast, read-only tool that scans your shell and reports what an AI agent could access: cloud IAM, API keys, Kubernetes, local tools, and more. # Install brew install Pringled/tap/agentcheck # Run agentcheck | Scanner | What it checks | |---|---| | AWS | Active credentials and whether they carry admin-level policies | | GCP | Active account and whether it holds owner or editor roles | | Azure | Active subscription and Owner / Contributor role assignments | | API Keys | 100+ env vars and credential files (OpenAI, Stripe, GitHub, etc.) | | Kubernetes | Active context, whether it points at a prod cluster | | Local | Docker daemon, SSH keys, Terraform config files, .env files | Every finding is tagged LOW , MODERATE , HIGH , or CRITICAL . UNCERTAIN findings (checks that timed out) are shown separately and never trigger CI failure. Severity policy | Severity | Criteria | Examples | |---|---|---| CRITICAL | Unrestricted access that cannot be further scoped or constrained. | AWS root credentials; active Vault token; kubectl pointed at a prod cluster; wildcard Kubernetes permissions | HIGH | Confirmed access to something dangerous, but scoped to a service, project, or account. | AWS AdministratorAccess policy; GCP roles/owner on a project; Azure Owner role; API keys (OpenAI, Stripe, etc.) | MODERATE | Access that could cause harm or enable lateral movement, but requires additional steps or has limited direct impact. | Docker daemon access; SSH keys loaded; Terraform config files in working directory; credential files on disk | LOW | Authenticated but no meaningful permissions found. | GCP account active with no project or roles | UNCERTAIN | Check timed out or could not complete. Never triggers CI failure. | IAM policy retrieval timeout; API call failed | The default CI threshold (--fail-on high ) blocks on HIGH and above, so admin-level IAM access and API keys fail the build in strict mode even though they are not CRITICAL . A useful pattern is to wrap your agent commands so every session starts with a scan: # Add to your .zshrc or .bashrc alias claude='agentcheck && claude' alias cursor='agentcheck && cursor' Block a pipeline if findings exceed a threshold: agentcheck --ci # fail if any HIGH or CRITICAL finding (default) agentcheck --ci --fail-on moderate # fail on MODERATE and above Exit code 1 when any finding meets or exceeds the threshold, 0 otherwise. UNCERTAIN findings never trigger failure. # GitHub Actions - name: agentcheck preflight run: agentcheck --ci agentcheck # rich table (default) agentcheck --json # machine-readable JSON agentcheck --markdown # paste into GitHub issues or PRs JSON output schema confirmed_total is critical + high + moderate + low. uncertain findings are excluded because they represent incomplete checks, not confirmed risks. Create ~/.agentcheck.yaml to set personal defaults, or .agentcheck.yaml in a project directory for project-level settings. # ~/.agentcheck.yaml # Default CI failure threshold (overridden by --fail-on on the CLI) fail_on: critical # Extra environment variable names to flag as high-risk extra_env_keys: - CORP_INTERNAL_API_KEY - MY_SERVICE_TOKEN # Extra credential files or directories to check extra_credential_files: - path: ~/.config/mycorp/token label: "MyCorp internal credentials" # Extra CLI tool checks (rc==0 means confirmed access) extra_tool_checks: - cmd: ["mycli", "whoami"] resource: mycli severity: moderate description: "Access to mycli confirmed." CLI flags always take precedence over config values. Config resolution order and security notes Resolution order (first found wins): $AGENTCHECK_CONFIG environment variable.agentcheck.yaml in the current working directory~/.agentcheck.yaml in the home directory Trusted vs. untrusted sources: $AGENTCHECK_CONFIG and ~/.agentcheck.yaml are trusted sources; you placed them there. A project-root .agentcheck.yaml is untrusted. A hostile repository must not be able to weaken your security posture when agentcheck is run inside it, so two fields are silently ignored from untrusted sources: extra_tool_checks : prevents executing attacker-controlled commandsfail_on : prevents raising the CI failure threshold and suppressing findings # Homebrew (macOS/Linux) brew tap Pringled/tap brew install agentcheck # Go install go install github.com/Pringled/agentcheck@latest # Direct download # https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck/releases # Build from source git clone https://github.com/Pringled/agentcheck.git cd agentcheck go build -o agentcheck ./cmd/agentcheck # Verify agentcheck version Thomas van Dongen MIT